Regulating in Pandemic: Evaluating Economic and Financial Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis by Hafiz, Hiba et al.
Boston College Law School 
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School 
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 
3-17-2020 
Regulating in Pandemic: Evaluating Economic and Financial 
Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis 
Hiba Hafiz 
Boston College Law School, hiba.hafiz@bc.edu 
Shu-Yi Oei 
Boston College Law School, shuyi.oei@bc.edu 
Diane M. Ring 
Boston College Law School, diane.ring@bc.edu 
Natalya Shnitser 
Boston College Law School, natalya.shnitser@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hiba Hafiz, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane M. Ring, and Natalya Shnitser. "Regulating in Pandemic: Evaluating Economic 
and Financial Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis." Working Paper (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
Draft 3/17/2020. In-Progress and Subject to Revision and Update 
REGULATING IN PANDEMIC: EVALUATING 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY RESPONSES TO THE 
CORONAVIRUS CRISIS 
Hiba Hafiz,* Shu-Yi Oei,** Diane Ring*** & Natalya Shnitser**** 
Boston College Law School 
ABSTRACT 
The United States is currently trying to manage a fast-moving public 
health crisis due to the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19). The economic 
and financial ramifications of the outbreak are serious. This Working Paper 
discusses these ramifications and identifies three interrelated but potentially 
conflicting policy priorities at stake in managing the economic and financial 
fallout of the COVID-19 crisis: (1) providing social insurance to individuals 
and families in need; (2) managing systemic economic and financial risk; 
and (3) encouraging critical spatial behaviors to help contain COVID-19 
transmission. The confluence of these three policy considerations and the 
potential conflicts among them make the outbreak a significant and unique 
regulatory challenge for policymakers, and one for which the consequences 
of getting it wrong are dire.  
 This Working Paper—which will be continually updated to reflect 
current developments—will analyze the major legislative and other policy 
initiatives that are being proposed and enacted to manage the economic and 
financial aspects of the COVID-19 crisis by examining these initiatives 
through the lens of these three policy priorities. It starts by analyzing the 
provisions of H.R. 6201 (the “Families First Coronavirus Responses Act”) 
passed by the house on March 14, 2020. By doing so, this Working Paper 
provides an analytical framework for evaluating these initiatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is currently trying to manage a fast-moving public health crisis 
due to the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19).1 The economic and financial ramifications 
of the outbreak have been serious and for many will likely prove devastating.2 In this 
Working Paper, we discuss these ramifications and their implications for law and 
regulation in the United States. We outline three important, interrelated policy concerns 
that demand increasing attention and that will need to be addressed by regulators managing 
the pandemic and its economic and social fallout. These are:  
1. Social Insurance. How to financially help individuals who have contracted or 
been exposed to COVID-19 (for example, those who are ill and have to stay home 
from work), or who are otherwise negatively affected (for example, workers caring 
for infected loved ones or facing layoffs). Current predictions suggest that lost 
wages and jobs may be staggering in some regions and sectors, resulting in an 
overwhelming economic toll on some of society’s most financially precarious 
members. Social insurance will be necessary to smooth consumption shocks caused 
by the public health crisis and responses thereto, but design and delivery decisions 
will have distributional effects, which could maintain or exacerbate existing wealth 
and resource inequalities.  
2. Broader Economic and Systemic Risk Management. How to ensure continued 
functioning of the financial and economic system, such as by providing stimulus 
against recession and preventing systemic failure. This is especially important in 
an environment in which businesses are experiencing sudden standstill and 
precipitous drops in business, supply chains are disrupted, and the stock market is 
in turmoil. Certain economic sectors—transportation, restaurants, hotels, 
 
1 Ray Sanchez, This Past Week Signaled a Turning Point in America's Health Emergency, CNN (Mar. 15, 
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/15/us/coronavirus-pandemic-us/index.html. 
2 McKibbin & Fernando (2020) (noting that in case of a global pandemic, economic costs of COVID-19 may 
be significant); Bonaparte (2020); Ben Casselman et al., Coronavirus Cost to Businesses and Workers: ‘It 
has All Gone to Hell’, NY TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/business/economy/coronavirus-economy-impact.html; FT Staff, Fed 
cuts rates to zero as part of sweeping crisis measures, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a9a28bc0-66fb-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75 (noting threats of COVID-19 crisis to 
economic growth and financial stability). 
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entertainment—are at risk of collapse than others, but direct bailouts of non-
financial firms do not necessarily substitute for social insurance measures. 
3. Spatio-Behavioral Management. How to incentivize and ensure that people abide 
by behaviors normally viewed as anti-social and recession-enhancing but have 
immediate social welfare benefits in the current crisis, such as social distancing, 
shelter-in-place, and staying home while sick (what we term “spatio-behavioral 
management”). Policymakers must tailor existing policy tools (designed to 
encourage behaviors that are socially beneficial and economically productive in 
normal times) that if applied under pandemic conditions, may have large negative 
spillover effects from a public health and possibly even an economic standpoint by 
spreading infection and prolonging the crisis. 
The confluence of these three policy considerations make the COVID-19 crisis truly unique 
from the standpoint of economic and financial regulation. Moreover, policymakers at all 
levels of government (as well as trade groups, businesses of all sizes, and individuals) are 
making decisions on the fly, in response to fast-moving and devastating medical realities, 
which include potentially severe medical system shortages, potentially high death rates if 
medical systems prove unable to keep up with infection rates, and a fast-rippling and 
potentially catastrophic economic and financial fallout.3  
This Working Paper does two things. First, it argues that the COVID-19 crisis 
presents a nearly unprecedented policy challenge for financial and economic regulation for 
the reasons stated above—the need to juggle social insurance, broader economic and 
systemic risk management, and spatio-behavioral management. These three policy 
concerns may come in tension with one another given the distinctive behavioral agenda 
and crisis backdrop against which policy decisions must be made. These tensions 
highlighted by our framing reveal the need for innovative and wide-ranging policy 
solutions that contend with multiple, competing policy goals and the unique contextual 
constraints.4 
 
3 Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, Mass General President: We Should be in ‘War-Like’ Preparations to Combat 
Coronavirus, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/15/business/mass-
general-president-compares-coronavirus-crisis-time-war/. 
4 See, e.g., Saez & Zucman (2020) (calling for government to act as buyer of last resort). 
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Second, the Paper—which will serve as a working document to be continually 
updated to reflect real-time developments—analyzes the major legislative and other policy 
proposals that are being proposed and/or enacted through the lens of the analytical 
framework articulated above. While obviously not every policy solution can satisfy each 
and every policy concern identified, analyzing the proposed policy solutions through the 
framework articulated in this paper is critical. It illuminates, for example, when a policy 
solution that might be social welfare-enhancing in an ordinary time may actually create 
negative effects (such as socially-harmful consumption behaviors) in the current public 
health emergency. Moreover, it highlights precisely where decisions driven by compelling 
public health exigencies are pushing financially vulnerable workers into crisis or leading 
to system-wide economic risks, and where policy responses driven by social insurance and 
systemic economic concerns may be causing public health problems. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: 
Part I sets forth an analytical framework for understanding and conceptualizing the 
COVID-19 crisis, conceptualizing it as a regulatory challenge with a distinctive underlying 
behavioral agenda that is crucial but (hopefully) temporary. Part II takes a deeper dive, 
outlining the unique challenges COVID-19 presents for designing policy that provides 
critical social insurance, ensures financial and economic stability, and spatio-behavioral 
management. Part III identifies multiple other key theoretical and policy tensions that may 
arise, such as the need for sectorally-targeted policymaking; coordination, non-
coordination, or competitive dynamics among different actors (e.g., global vs. federal vs. 
state; public vs. quasi-public vs. private); choice of policy instrument (e.g., taxation vs. 
direct delivery vs. command and control; cash-based vs. in-kind; supply-side vs. demand-
side); tensions between systemic stability and fairness considerations; and public finance 
and monetary policy concerns. Combined, these tensions point to the insufficiency of 
existing theoretical paradigms in economic and tax policy to respond to the current public 
health and economic crisis. Part IV serves as a running update of proposed and enacted 
legislative and other policy solutions to COVID-19 through the lens of our framework. 
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I. THE COVID-19 POLICY CHALLENGE 
A. A Regulatory Challenge with Spatio-Behavioral Constraints 
The dire policy challenge presented by the COVID-19 crisis can be described in 
more detail as follows:  
Unlike countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Singapore (which are engaging 
in some combination of widespread monitoring and testing, temperature-taking, and/or 
contract-tracing),5 the U.S. approach has focused on travel restrictions, home quarantines, 
“social distancing” (closing schools, museums, and other spaces, and cancelling events 
with large crowds),6  and, ultimately, “shelter-in-place” public health orders requiring 
residents to remain home “except for essential needs.”7 These measures have become 
increasingly draconian and this trend is likely to continue. These measures—like those in 
Europe—have an important behavioral and spatial component. They generally recognize 
that certain behaviors, which in normal times would not be particularly blameworthy or 
per se harmful, and would even be socially and economically beneficial, are now very 
risky. But these measures designed to improve public health outcomes also risk causing 
large financial losses to big and small businesses (like the travel, airline, cruise, restaurant, 
entertainment, and sports industries) and significant job and wage losses to individuals. 
Ultimately, they may trigger economic recession or widespread financial meltdown.8 This 
is particularly so because the COVID-19 crisis is likely to stretch for months.  
These facts lead to an economic and social policy conflict: the anticipated economic 
slowdown is the inevitable outcome of the precise form of public health response the 
United States is pursuing—one that temporarily discourages risky social and economic 
 
5 Benjamin Cowling & Wei Wen Lim, They’ve Contained the Coronavirus. Here’s How, NY Times (Mar. 
13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/opinion/coronavirus-best-response.html. 
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health 
Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures: Geographic Risk 
and Contacts of Laboratory-confirmed Cases, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/risk-
assessment.html (definition and guidelines on social distancing) (last updated Mar. 7, 2020). 
7 “Stay home except for essential needs, SF.gov. (Monday, March 16, 2020) (reporting: “On Monday March 
16, San Francisco with Health Officers from the Bay Area announced a Public Health Order that requires 
residents to stay home except for essential needs” starting March 17, 2020), https://sf.gov/stay-home-except-
essential-needs. 
8 Casselman et. al, supra note 2; Julia Horowitz, Here’s What Could Really Sink the Global Economy: $19 
Trillion in Risky Corporate Debt (Mar. 14, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/14/investing/corporate-debt-
coronavirus/index.html 
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behaviors until the COVID-19 threat abates. Under normal circumstances, consumptive 
behaviors like attending a sporting event or concert, sitting in a crowded bar, or going to 
work or a restaurant or a party are socially and economically important and may help avoid 
recession. But in the current public health crisis, these behaviors risk accelerating the 
spread of the virus and potentially perpetuating recession if they cause the public health 
crisis to be prolonged.9 Among the social behaviors of greatest concern is that workers 
without paid sick leave—including self-employed workers—may face significant financial 
burdens if they do not work and that these burdens may incite them to go to work (which 
involves being in public places) while ill. This prospect is particularly concerning in light 
of growing medical evidence that virus transmission can happen even while 
asymptomatic.10 Accordingly, such individual utility-maximizing decisions could give rise 
to large negative externalities and trigger a systemic public health crisis, increasing virus 
transmission, overwhelming the medical system, and causing others to get sick or die.   
Thus, the current crisis suggests three interlocking policy goals, which are likely to 
come into in conflict: (1) providing social insurance for individuals who may experience 
job and wage loss due to the COVID-19 outbreak; (2) ensuring financial and economic 
system robustness and stability; and (3) crucially, achieving the above goals while also 
advancing a critical overarching spatio-behavioral management agenda—that of 
encouraging behaviors like social distancing and discouraging behaviors like congregating 
in large numbers or going to work while sick. These risks can be pictorially depicted as 
follows: 
 
9 Guy Chazan & Sam Fleming, Germany Wields “Bazooka” in Fight Against Coronavirus, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1b0f0324-6530-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5. 
10 Elizabeth Cohen, Infected People Without Symptoms Might be Driving the Spread of Coronavirus More 
than We Realized, CNN (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/14/health/coronavirus-
asymptomatic-spread/index.html. 
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Unlike other economic crises in which general stimulation of consumer confidence 
to avoid recession may have been a priority and a viable policy tool,11 the COVID-19 crisis 
presents a case in which the types of available economic policy instruments may be 
constrained by behavioral, spatial, and other considerations. In particular, policies must 
disincentivize certain temporarily harmful behaviors that center around “socially-intimate 
consumption” and engagement with others.  
This framing of the policy challenge suggests the need for carefully crafted, highly 
interdisciplinary solutions. It reveals the fact that financial and economic management of 
the COVID-19 crisis will require input from experts across a wide swath of legal and policy 
fields (including social insurance, tax, labor and employment, financial regulation, 
monetary law, consumer protection, and business law). It also suggests that the usual policy 
tools of social insurance and fiscal stimulus need to be carefully tailored in order to work 
well in the current context. Yet, the very seriousness of the economic fallout may mean 
that nuanced approaches are impossible and “bazookas” might end up being used.12 
 
11 Shapiro & Slemrod (2009); Jason Furman, The Case for a Big Coronavirus Stimulus, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 
5, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-a-big-coronavirus-stimulus-11583448500. 
12  See Chazan, supra note 9; compare Omarova & Feibelman (2008) (noting risks of conflating crisis 
management with regulatory reform).  
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It will become clearer over time how the three policy priorities we have identified 
rank, and their ranking may also shift over time. For example, we may envision a scenario 
in which the risks of financial collapse are so profound that they eclipse spatio-behavioral 
and social insurance considerations in designing policy responses. Or alternatively, we may 
see strands of each policy interest displayed in a given piece of legislation. This Working 
Paper aims to identify how these policy priorities surface and conflict in the economic and 
financial management of the COVID-19 crisis, to identify shifts in prioritization that may 
occur, and to derive insights from such prioritization and its shifts. 
II. A DEEPER DIVE INTO THREE KEY POLICY CHALLENGES 
This Part takes a deeper dive into the three, interrelated policy goals identified 
above. The discussion is not comprehensive but rather aims to cast a broad net over key 
theoretical and policy issues. 
 
A. Social Insurance 
Social insurance systems essentially involve the transfer of pooled risk from 
citizens and taxpayers to governments in exchange for a price on those insured.13 While 
there is no universal definition, social insurance is usually mandatory (hence “social”).14 
As is the case with private insurance, the risk transfer occurs upon a “covered event,” which 
might include financial shocks experienced upon retirement, loss of a job, or a medical 
crisis.15  The price might be extracted from citizens in various ways: directly through 
taxation or indirectly through reduction in social welfare benefits received, inflation, or 
national borrowing that must be repaid in the form of interest.16 Social insurance can be 
delivered through various vehicles, some more obvious than others. For example, 
unemployment insurance, Medicare, and disability insurance may seem obvious delivery 
mechanisms. But scholars have also suggested, for example, that consumer bankruptcy, 
 
13 See, e.g., Lester (2001); Willett (1951) 
14 Krueger & Mayer (2002). 
15 Marmor & Mashaw (2007); Oei (2012). 
16 Oei (2012). 
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forgiveness of tax debts, and spousal support might be construed to perform a partial social 
insurance function.17 
Provision of government-provided social insurance is especially appropriate where 
private insurance is not available on the market for the risk in question.18 Moreover, some 
argue that the government may be especially well-positioned to provide social insurance 
because of its unique ability to spread risks intergenerationally (as is the case with some 
social security systems). 19  In a crisis like the COVID-19 crisis, it makes sense for 
governments to provide social insurance and an expanded social safety net because they 
are uniquely positioned to spread infection risk across the population and, perhaps more 
importantly, across generations (given that a large swath of the population may be affected 
by the virus and need to draw on the insurance).  
While social insurance and social welfare are not identical, they are related because 
they are two key ways in which the government provides security to its citizens. 20 
Moreover, because the mechanism of extracting the social insurance “premium” is not 
always visible, it can be difficult to distinguish the two. In any case, in delivering social 
insurance and social welfare, a critical question presented in the existing literature concerns 
whether such insurance should be provided directly (for example, through cash infusions 
such as a universal basic income (UBI), food stamps) or indirectly (through tax 
expenditures or some other means).21 Tax expenditures generally denote spending that 
occurs through the Tax Code, such as the earned income tax credit (EITC)22 or other 
deductions and credits that deviate from a “normal” tax baseline. 23  Another related 
question is how much such social safety net benefits should be tied to work.24 Examples of 
social-insurance benefits tied to work are employer-provided health insurance and paid 
 
17 Adler, Pollack & Schwartz (2000); Feibelman (2005); Lawless et. al (2008); Oei (2011, 2012); Sullivan, 
Warren & Westbrook (2020). 
18 Braucher (2003). 
19 Marmor & Mashaw (2007); Brown (2010). 
20 Oei (2012). 
21 Avraham & Logue (2002); Alstott (1995); Weisbach & Nussim (2003). 
22 Alstott (1995). The EITC provides income support for the working poor but is claimed by filing a tax 
return. 
23 Surrey (1970); Bittker (1969); Bittker (1969); Thuronyi (1988); The tax expenditure definition is contested 
and has been widely criticized, and the definition is more complicated than this. For detailed discussion, see 
Joint Committee on Taxation (2008); Kleinbard (2010). 
24 Estlund (2018); Oei & Ring (2019). 
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sick leave benefits. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, yet another important question 
will be whether support for individuals impacted by the crisis is delivered to the individuals 
themselves (either via direct cash, in-kind benefits, increased unemployment benefits, or 
via a tax credit) or to the businesses employing them (again, either via direct cash or 
indirectly through the tax system) to help avoid layoffs. 
A central question raised by this Paper’s analytical framework is how the answers 
to these choice-of-delivery questions may have to change or be varied in situations in 
which we want to encourage certain types of behaviors (e.g., staying home) but discourage 
others (e.g., going to crowded spaces), where time is of the essence, and where broader 
systemic and other economic considerations are also in play.  
 
B. Systemic and Economic Considerations 
Systemic Risk in Financial Regulation. Scholars of financial regulation have long 
been attuned to the need to manage systemic risk.25 Systemic risk refers to the risks of 
financial contagion—the cascading or domino effects of bank failure. The 2008 financial 
crisis, for example, spread quickly and with devastating effect from subprime mortgages 
and their securitization,26 concerned creative financial instruments and derivatives (such as 
CDOs),27 and led to a full-scale banking crisis.28 Major financial institutions needed to be 
bailed out, but bailout was reserved for institutions regarded as systemically important.29  
Systemic Risk in Non-Financial Regulation. Although much is yet unknown, the 
COVID-19 crisis is likely to present systemic risk challenges to non-financial firms and 
economic sectors. 30  These challenges are likely to be different and potentially more 
widespread than those presented in 2008.31 Most materially, contagion and domino effects 
are likely to occur in and across industries—not just the financial sector—and lead to 
 
25 Omarova (2008, 2013); McCoy (2009); Levitin (2010); Posner (2009); Ricks (2016).  
26 Engel & McCoy (2007); McCoy (2009), Pavolv & Wachter (2009), 
27 Omarova (2008). 
28 Ayotte (2009); Levitin (2010).  
29 Ayotte (2009); Casey & Posner (2015); Levitin (2010); Stern & Feldman (2004). 
30 FT Staff, supra note 2; Albulescu (2020); Ramelli & Wagner (2020). 
31 Compare Krippner (2011) (characterizing turn to finance in the 1960s and 70s as inadvertently resulting 
from the nation state’s attempts to solve other social economic and political problems); Omarova & 
Feibelman (2008) (calling for post-crisis evaluation of financial market architecture before reforming 
institutional structure). 
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cascading ripple effects and system failures. These failures may well have feedback effects 
on the financial sector. While the precise pathways are still unknown, in the past few weeks, 
we have seen turmoil in the financial markets, tripping of financial circuit breakers, 
intervention by the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort (dropping interest rates and 
pumping over a trillion dollars into the financial system), pain in the airline and cruise 
industries, Boeing and other companies rushing to raise cash, and sectoral layoffs.32 Some 
commentators also predict potential corporate debt defaults, a wave of bankruptcies, 
business inability to pay workers, widespread layoffs, and declining consumer and investor 
confidence.33  
These types of developments suggest that there may be different, non-financial 
pathways through which systemic contagion manifests. For example, closures of 
universities and colleges and cancellation of graduations have led to a wave of hotel room 
cancellations, which may lead to layoffs in the hotel industry. Mandatory restaurant 
closures may have cascading effects due to reduced demand for linens, laundry services, 
equipment rentals, food, and workers. 34  This may lead to widespread problems like 
business inability to pay rent on property and equipment or inability to service corporate 
debt. The end result may be waves of business collapse across certain industries.    
 Supply Chain Risk. One potentially important source of systemic risk is supply 
chain risk. Vertical disintegration and decentralized supply chain networks for inputs and 
outputs has created a network of production and distribution highly sensitive to 
transportation delays, spatial constraints in movement because of quarantines or other 
movement restrictions, and longer-term storage costs. These can cause breakdowns in 
 
32 Nick Timiraos & Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Fed to Inject $1.5 Trillion in Bid to Prevent ‘Unusual Disruptions’ 
in Markets, WALL ST. J. (March 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-to-inject-1-5-trillion-in-bid-to-
prevent-unusual-disruptions-in-markets-11584033537; Liz Hoffman, Diary of a Crazy Week in the Markets, 
Wall. St. J. (Mar. 14, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/diary-of-a-crazy-week-in-the-markets-
11584143715; Molly Smith et al., Credit Market Stress Deepens with Companies Racing to Raise Cash, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-11/europe-s-corporate-
bond-market-re-opens-as-stimulus-begins; Shwanika Narayan & Chase DeFeliciantonio, Bay Area Layoffs 
Mount Swiftly Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, S.F. Chron. (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Bay-Area-layoffs-mount-amid-the-coronavirus-
15128141.php. 
33 Id.; see also, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 8; Binder (2020). 
34  Massachusetts Governor’s Order regarding Restaurant Closures and Restrictions (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2020/03/15/charlie-baker-order-gatherings-25-dining-in-
restaurants. 
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supply chains that can quickly lead to systemic collapse of entire industries and across 
economic sectors. 35  This is true both in supply chains that service consumption of 
necessary as well as luxury commodities and services. 36  Supply-chain resiliency has 
become thinner as more firms have become dependent—through innovations in logistics 
and technology—on highly efficient systems of transportation and storage to which they 
can turn for just-in-time delivery.37 For example, health-care providers rely extensively on 
supply chains for just-in-time delivery of medicines, keeping limited supplies on hand to 
prevent wasted value on stock shelves.  
While supply chain networks can be efficient in ordinary times, they create risks of 
economic collapse in times of pandemic like the COVID-19 crisis that demand movement 
constraints. 38  The risk we are concerned with here is truly systemic in the sense of 
potentially producing breakdowns in supply chains as well as widespread national 
shortages with cascading effects (such as layoffs or debt defaults) that can ultimately propel 
systemic collapse, as opposed to simply a risk-management issue for individual firms.39 
We are already seeing evidence of supply chain problems as the COVID-19 crisis unfolds, 
including car manufacturing plants in other countries being shut down due to shortage of 
parts from China, and potential drug shortages due to countries that are producers of 
ingredients limiting exports in crisis time.40 If there is system-wide breakdown in supply 
chains—particularly of the stripe that causes widespread national or international shortages 
 
35 See, e.g., Tom Linton & Bindiya Vakil, Coronavirus is Proving We Need More Resilient Supply Chains, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (March 5, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/coronavirus-is-proving-that-we-need-more-
resilient-supply-chains; Peck (2006). 
36 See, e.g., Weil (2014); Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond & Weil (1999).  
37 Wagner & Bode (2012) (examining how supply chain characteristics—including firm dependence on 
customers and suppliers, degree of single sourcing, and reliance on global supply sources—affect firms’ 
supply chain risk; noting tradeoffs between efficiency and risk management). 
38 See, e.g., Christopher Rowland & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Surge in Coronavirus Patients Threatens to Swamp 
U.S. Hospitals, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/14/hospital-doctors-patients-coronavirus/; Chuck 
Green, Hospitals Turn to Just-in-Time Buying to Control Supply Chain Costs, HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS 
(May 6, 2015), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hospitals-turn-just-time-buying-control-
supply-chain-costs. 
39 Much of prevailing literature appears to focus on risk to firms themselves. Ho, Zheng, Yildiz & Talluri 
(2015). Peck (2005, 2006). 
40 Katelyn Polantz, Health care and consumer industry groups concerned about supply shortages during 
coronavirus pandemic, CNN (Mar. 15, 2020),  https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/15/politics/supply-chain-
shortages-coronavirus-pandemic/index.html; BBC News, Nissan to shut Japan factory due to shortage of 
Chinese parts, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51441344. 
14 
 
of necessities—this suggests that supply chain regulation needs to be approached as a 
systemic matter, not just as a risk-management matter for individual firms.  
Lessons from 2008 and New Questions. We can draw some lessons and common 
threads from regulatory management of the 2008 financial crisis. One core issue emerging 
from the 2008 crisis is the extent to which ex post bailouts should be used, and, if so, 
whether they should be used only for actors presenting truly systemic risk—in the sense of 
being “too big to fail” or likely to cause economic contagion and financial collapse—or 
more broadly as a matter of fairness and social insurance.41 And, of course, a key question 
is how to weigh competing considerations in making that judgment and what procedures 
should be put in place to facilitate these decisions. Related important issues are whether 
selective bailouts (for example, letting small, systemically unimportant businesses collapse 
while propping up systemically important actors) are fair, whether they raise moral hazard 
concerns, and whether existing bankruptcy regimes that are known about and priced in ex 
ante are preferable to using bailouts.42 
But the COVID-19 crisis presents novel concerns never addressed in the 2008 
financial crisis. As noted, in this pandemic environment, “systemic risk” no longer merely 
concerns banking industry collapse but may be triggered from multiple potential sources 
and take several different paths. This multi-sourced systemic risk raises a number of 
questions, not least the limits of the Federal Reserve’s ability to stem the current crisis.43 
Another key question for our purposes is how to manage potential conflicts and tensions 
between systemic risk concerns and those of social insurance and spatio-behavioral 
constraints.44 For example, if there are widespread business failures across many smaller 
businesses, should these businesses be kept afloat by government intervention even though 
individually they may not be “too big to fail”?45 Not only might such an intervention be 
advisable on social insurance grounds, but it is also possible that a widespread wave of 
small business failures—even if they are not individually systemic actors—may ripple 
 
41 Ayotte (2009); Kaufman (2014); Levitin (2008, 2010); Stern & Feldman (2004). 
42 Ayotte (2009); Levitin (2008, 2010); Omarova (2013); Tuch (2017); Casey & Posner (2015). 
43  Neil Irwin, The Fed Deployed Its 2008 Arsenal All in One Weekend, NY TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/upshot/coronavirus-fed-crisis-playbook.html.  
44 See discussion supra Part II.A and infra Part II.C. 
45 Ayotte (2009); Levitin (2010); Casey & Posner (2015).  
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across other parts of the economy and eventually trigger contagion and collapse. Relatedly, 
should businesses be given cash support to prop them up—the sort of incremental bailout 
currently being suggested in Germany?46 Such a solution might help keep businesses afloat 
and prevent widespread defaults, while also not encouraging harmful types of socially-
intimate consumption. More broadly, what is the role of consumers and consumption in 
preventing recession in the COVID-19 context, and how should this be managed in light 
of the spatio-behavioral constraints discussed above?47  
Looking longer term, we will also have to assess whether financial and other 
deregulation (including deregulatory moves since the 2008 crisis) may cause or exacerbate 
economic and systemic problems now, and what policy responses might be appropriate.48 
 System-Wide Problems that are Not “Systemic.” It is true that not all system-wide 
failures will necessarily present systemic risks in the sense of causing contagion, industry 
collapse, or monetary crisis. However, system-wide risks create significant hardship. 
Further, it is difficult to know when cascading ripple effects will occur. Thus, it may make 
sense for policymakers to err on the side of false positives—adopting policies that 
safeguard against potential systemic risks on an overinclusive basis—even if those system-
wide risks end up being non-systemic. 
 
C. Spatio-Behavioral Management 
Finally, the COVID-19 crisis in the United States has an important and distinctive 
spatio-behavioral component. The current crisis involves the public health need to maintain 
“social distancing” to avoid infecting others, “flatten the curve” to avoid a medical facilities 
crunch, and generally minimize COVID-19 spread.49 The social distancing measures in 
place have become increasingly more draconian over time and are likely to become even 
more so. The need to socially distance has resulted in school, university, and restaurant 
closures, cancellation of sporting events, employers’ displacement of workers to remote 
work or telework arrangements, and city-wide “shelter-in-place” orders enforcing 
 
46 Chazan & Fleming, supra note 9. 
47 Id.  
48 See, e.g., Brewin (2014). 
49 Nicholson, Shah, Ogawa & Nat’l Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2019) (discussing 
strategies to flatten the pandemic curve). 
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distancing, among other consequences.50 Moreover, these developments are truly national 
in scope, and they also take place amid similar concurrent developments occurring across 
the globe. These facts make the current crisis different from other disasters, such as the 
2008 financial crisis, 9/11, the 1995 Chicago Heat Wave, Hurricane Katrina, the Oil 
Embargo of 1972, the polio crisis of 1950, and even World War II.51 
Managing a public health crisis under these new spatio-behavioral constraints 
introduces significant risk that improper tailoring of stimulus funds and systemic risk 
management could result in significant and cascading social and economic effects. 
Contrary to standard economic patterns, spatially-intimate behaviors are the very triggers 
instigating a widespread economic slowdown (by accelerating the spread of the virus). As 
such they now constitute a serious public health risk. But much of existing economic 
policy, including macroeconomic and fiscal stimulus policies, is designed for non-
pandemic environments and has presumed that these exact behaviors are socially valuable 
and economically productive.   
This policy/environment mismatch suggests the need for specifically-tailored 
policy solutions and raises important vehicle and design questions. For example, might we 
want to use Pigouvian taxation to temporarily disincentivize certain behaviors? Or more 
direct behavioral “nudges”?52 Or still more direct “command-and-control” regulation?53  
How inadequate might indirect nudges be during times of crisis?  
Or, take the case of worries about economic distortions in choosing between tax 
rules and legal rules in redistributing income.54 While in a “normal” situation we might 
worry about inefficiencies and economic distortions in choice of a taxpayer’s activities 
(including labor-leisure distortions), the COVID-19 crisis might present a case in which 
some types of labor-leisure distortion (tilting in favor of staying home) may be desirable, 
and, moreover, in which additional inefficiencies and distortions in certain sectors might 
not be a bad thing. 
 
50 See supra note 6.  
51 See, e.g., Lipman (2003); Klinenberg (1995). 
52 Gamage & Shanske (2011); Thaler & Sunstein (2009). 
53 Galle (2013, 2017);  Masuer & Posner (2015). 
54 Kaplow and Shavell (1994); Avraham, Fortus & Logue (2003); Sanchirico (2000). 
17 
 
Importantly, the spatio-behavioral outcomes the United States will want to see, and 
the available policy tools to achieve them, will in part reflect the underlying society in 
which we live and the existing legal and regulatory structure. For example, the United 
States is not a country in which the government is prone to frequent distributions of toilet 
paper, substantial direct cash aid, or serving as a buyer of last resort, although such in-kind 
distributions do occur in emergency situations and may be necessary now.55 Furthermore, 
most spatial restrictions are being initiated by private actors or state and local government 
authorities, at least at the outset, though there is also federal authority to mandate 
quarantine.56  
III. KEY THEORETICAL AND POLICY TENSIONS 
We predict that several other key theoretical and policy ideas and tensions will be 
important in analyzing and managing the economic and financial aspects of the COVID-
19 crisis: 
 
A. The New Sectoral Policymaking 
The current crisis may require new ways of thinking about or targeting specific 
sectors of the economy. For example, we might normally classify firms into manufacturing 
vs. retail or health vs. education. But in the current crisis, we are likely to see winners and 
losers divided along different lines. For example, massage therapists and restaurants are 
likely to face more and sooner impacts due to “social-distancing” measures than, say, 
psychotherapists (who can be further from clients or conduct online sessions). Businesses 
with significant PPE (property, plant, and equipment) obligations through leases or other 
liability requirements may find those harder to terminate than cutting costs by laying off 
 
55 Nik DeCosta Klipa, Mitt Romney Proposes Sending Every American Adult a $1,000 check as Part of 
Coronavirus Response, Boston.com (Mar. 16, 
2020),https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2020/03/16/mitt-romney-coronavirus-response. [Can maybe 
cite to the Saez piece here]. 
56  Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78–410, 58 Stat. 682; Larry Gostin,  
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200310.824973/full/. 
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workers. Given these disparities, the current crisis may require new ways of thinking about 
how to economically target relief for different industries or sectors.  
These new sector-specific considerations may present challenges in meeting the 
three policy goals that we outlined above (social insurance, economic and systemic 
considerations, and spatio-behavioral considerations). For example, it may be the case that 
supporting or bailing out a certain type of business aligns with the goal of managing 
systemic and economic risks, if the industry in question is a significant one whose collapse 
is likely to trigger financial contagion, sector-wide or cross-sector collapse. On the other 
hand, sectoral targeting considerations may be justified for social insurance reasons but not 
be a priority from the perspective of systemic risk management. As another example, the 
need to support certain sectors may also run contrary to spatio-behavioral management 
goals in enabling or encouraging certain types of consumption (e.g., online spending or 
continued access to daily necessities such as groceries and medicines) but constraining 
others (e.g., “socially-intimate” spending such as going out to bars and restaurants). It may 
turn out that a combination of direct regulation (such as local restrictions on restaurant 
capacity,  hours, or modes of operation) and indirect measures (such as cash transfers or 
transfers through the tax system) may best advance these goals. 
 
B. Policy Complementarities and Conflicts 
Relatedly, we also predict that the policy challenge confronting us will sometimes 
give rise to tensions and conflicts but may also present opportunities for policy 
complementarities. An example of a complementarity may be where measures that deliver 
social insurance by delivering benefits (such as tax cuts or credits) to hiring firms to help 
them stay afloat and encourage them to not lay off workers also serve important systemic 
functions like preventing widespread bankruptcies and debt defaults, maintaining 
important supply chains, and preventing financial contagion. An example of a regulatory 
tension might be a case in which social insurance measures that boost pay to workers leads 
to the kinds of undesirable “socially-intimate” consumption that is especially harmful in 
the current context.  
Another regulatory tension comes when considering shorter- versus longer-term 
policy impacts. For example, in the current environment in which widespread social-
19 
 
distancing measures are already in place and many businesses are closing, employer-side 
measures may be valuable in helping to prop up businesses to keep them running (thereby 
potentially providing social insurance and managing systemic risk), but over the longer 
term, may have the effect of transferring even more power to hiring firms and increasing 
their monopsony power over workers to reduce hiring and suppress wages (thereby leading 
to diminished employment and purchasing power).57 
 
C. Who Acts and with What Instrument? 
Theoretical and policy tensions also emerge between the sets of actors triaging the 
crisis and the respective instruments they deploy.  
1. A Range of Different Public and Private Actors  
Since COVID-19 is both a national and global crisis, we are seeing interventions 
by public actors (at the global, federal, state, and municipal levels) as well as by private 
actors (trade groups, firms, nonprofits, private foundations, and individuals).58 The federal 
government has tasked itself with enacting legislation and granting authority to 
administrative agencies to administer benefits and waivers. 59  It is also collaborating 
directly with State governments through block grants for unemployment and health 
insurance.60 States have used emergency powers to declare “States of Emergency,” and 
both States and municipalities have deployed their licensing and other authority to mandate 
“shelter-in-place” restrictions, limit public gatherings, and order school, restaurant, 
entertainment, and recreational facility closures. Private actors have organized at the level 
of industry associations or private business organizations to pool resources and lobby for 
relief bills, but private efforts at triage have extended down to the local and interpersonal 
level with GoFundMe pages for local restaurants and college faculty Paypalling students 
travel funds to return home after campus closures. Private actors also rely on existing forms 
 
57 See generally Manning (2003); Naidu & Posner (2019). 
58 See generally Hockett & Omarova (2014, 2016) (conceptualizing finance as public-private partnership). 
59 See infra Part IV. 
60 Id. 
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of financial pooling, whether in the form of private savings, retirement benefits,61 social 
security, and others. 
 Coordination costs between all of these actors are astronomically high. There have 
been and continue to be tensions emerging among public actors in terms of their respective 
jurisdictions, their policy priorities (demand- vs. supply-side relief, local vs. systemic 
relief, spatio-behavioral management vs. stimulus, etc.), and their valued instruments for 
administering relief. Additionally, tensions will emerge—and likely escalate—between 
private and public actors, not only with regard to the delivery of social insurance by private 
vs. public actors, but also with regard to equitable allocation of scarce resources between 
private actors. 
2.  A Range of Different Policy Instruments 
Additionally, each of these public and private actors have and are deploying 
different instruments for advancing their chosen policy priorities. There are several well-
recognized options: Pigouvian taxation, command-and-control approaches, “cap-and-
trade” approaches (i.e., maximum limits on the amount of a negative behavior, paired with 
a marketplace for trading rights to engage in that behavior), behavioral nudges, cash grants, 
in-kind benefits, or tax expenditures.  
Going forward, an open question will be how the various actors deploy these policy 
instruments in managing the crisis. For example, Federal, state, or municipal governments 
may use command-and-control approaches in a pandemic to contain or quarantine 
communities (e.g., New Rochelle, New York) or individuals (e.g., cruise passengers) as 
well as to disincentivize public gatherings (e.g., closing local businesses and limiting group 
gatherings). But governments may more directly mandate specific behaviors—mandatory 
testing, curfews, and so on.62  Some countries (such as the U.K.) have opted  against 
instituting bans and closures (at least in the early stages) in favor of a range of behavioral 
 
61 Shnitser (2016). 
62 These measures have not yet been implemented in the United States but have been utilized abroad. 
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nudges: educational campaigns on hand-washing and not touching your face, visually 
reinforcing social distancing in all public announcements, and so on.63   
Timing may also play a role in determining the choice of, effectiveness of, and 
interplay between policy instruments. At the height of a pandemic, when quarantines or 
general lock-downs (i.e., direct behavioral controls) are being implemented by State or 
local governments, economic policies such as expanded paid sick leave that encourage ill 
workers to stay home may play a more incremental, supporting role in furthering spatio-
behavioral management. For example, such provisions may encourage sick workers to 
comply with lock-down regulations and not seek to skirt the rules in order to earn wages. 
But as the public health crisis begins to abate and governments gradually lift their lock-
down rules, well-designed social insurance policies may play a more central role in 
encouraging sick or potentially exposed workers to follow best practices despite the lifting 
of direct restrictions on their movements. 
 The three policy priorities this Paper identifies—social insurance, systemic risk 
management, and spatio-behavioral management—may be more and less aggressively 
pursued by the range of public and private actors discussed, and may be more or less 
effectively advanced by the various policy instruments. For example, States may emerge 
as predominantly using command-and-control regulation through their police and licensing 
powers (which may trigger unemployment), while the federal government may prioritize 
systemic risk management. But federal government actions may conflict with state and 
local regulation or policy priorities. And systemic risk management may ignore or enhance 
the delivery of social insurance. For example, macroeconomic measures coupled with paid 
sick and family leave mandates and unemployment insurance may try to cure 
unemployment, but they are not tailored to differential types of spatio-behavioral 
consumption that could spread the virus with longer-term economic and health effects. 
 
 
63 These approaches have been justified on public health—to increase “herd immunity”—and economic 
grounds. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/13/why-is-the-government-relying-on-
nudge-theory-to-tackle-coronavirus. 
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D. Regulatory Triage 
Another key and related point is the lack of a “central planner”64 to coordinate 
across policy fields. To be sure (as we discuss below), a national state of emergency has 
been declared in the United States, and a federal relief bill is in the works. But even at the 
federal level, we have yet to see a coordinated policy approach on designing and 
implementing the optimal mix of financial stability, social insurance, public health, or 
spatio-behavioral incentives for coping with the public health, socio- economic, and 
financial ramifications of COVID-19.  
Nor is it clear that there is time to think through the optimal combination of policy 
instruments for managing the economic and financial aspects of the COVID-19 crisis, 
something we might want to do in an ideal world. For example, we might theoretically 
want to consider what might be the “right” combination of tax expenditures as opposed to 
directly-delivered social insurance or economic support benefits. Or, we might want to 
consider how a payroll tax credit might interact with a directly-delivered cash benefit. In 
current conditions, however, choice of instrument may turn out to be piecemeal or driven 
primarily by political compromise or crisis-magnitude at certain moments rather than what 
is theoretically optimal or optimal long-term. 
What we are likely to see, then, is a state of regulatory triage in managing the 
regulatory challenge as legislators, government leaders, and regulators struggle to identify 
and implement the optimal mix of policy instruments. 
 
E. Systemic and Aggregate vs. Efficiency and Fairness Considerations 
Another important tension that we envision is the interplay of systemic 
considerations against more “static” considerations of efficiency and fairness. Scholars of 
financial regulation are familiar with addressing systemic considerations—like risks of 
financial contagion or multiple bank failures—and many recognize that, in certain “second-
best” crisis scenarios, systemic considerations may have to take precedence over 
considerations of fairness.65 Meanwhile, scholars of social insurance and social security 
 
64 While a COVID-19 task force has been assembled, it is not clear the extent to which it is serving a 
coordinating function among the different federal, state, local, industry, and private actors. 
65 See discussion and sources cited supra Part II.C. But see Casey & Posner (2015). 
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are also familiar with the idea that premiums paid for such insurance or security (however 
extracted) tend not to be perfectly risk-adjusted and may in fact be borne primarily by 
groups other than those most likely to draw on the insurance (e.g., future generations), but 
that, in the aggregate, such insurance is important.66 However, in other fields (including 
taxation, public finance, and labor law) and among lay people,  considerations of equity 
and fairness may be more prominent, and large-scale interventions that only benefit 
systemically-important actors may be perceived to be unfair.67  
The fact of the matter is that the regulatory solutions and relief policies used to 
manage the COVID-19 crisis will likely have large distributive and fairness effects, 
whether they are direct measures put in place to ensure public health or financial and 
economic relief measures enacted to respond to the crisis.68 Moreover, even if we fail to 
put in place any social insurance or relief policies whatsoever, we will still see large 
redistributive effects due to the differential impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak on different 
actors and sectors. 
 
F. Public Finance and Monetary Policy 
Another set of issues that will gradually become apparent are those concerning 
public finance. We are operating in a time of large federal deficits and national debt.69 Tax 
and public finance scholars have expressed concern that recent tax reforms (including the 
2017 tax reforms) will exacerbate this.70 But concerns over deficits and the national debt 
are not universal.71 Heterodox monetary policy approaches (such as modern monetary 
 
66 See discussion and sources cited supra Part II.A. 
67 Auerbach & Hassett (2002); Kaplow (1982, 2000); Musgrave (2002).  
68 For example, the City of Boston has imposed new rules requiring that boston bars and food establishments 
must halve their capacity and close by 11 pm. These rules are likely to have significant negative impacts on 
restaurant revenues and business. Christopher Gavin, Marty Walsh Imposes New Rules on Boston’s 
Restaurants, Bars Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, Boston.com (Mar. 15, 2020), 
 https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2020/03/15/boston-restaurants-bars-new-rules-coronavirus.  
69 Congressional Budget Office (2019) (predicting federal budget deficit exceeding $1 trillion each year 
beginning in 2022; and predicting that federal debt held by the public is projected to reach 93% of GDP in 
2029 and 150% of GDP in 2049). 
70 Howard Gleckman, What Trillion Dollar Deficits In An Era of Full Employment Look Like, TAXVOX (Jan. 
7, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/what-trillion-dollar-deficits-era-full-employment-look. 
71 Buchanan (2011a, 2011b); see also Howard Gleckman, The Federal Deficit Is Headed For $1 Trillion. 
Should We Care?, TAXVOX (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/federal-deficit-headed-
1-trillion-should-we-care; Jason Furman and Lawrence H. Summers, Who’s Afraid of Budget Deficits?, 
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theory) argue that monetary policy is far more important than tax policy in managing and 
financing the economy, and some note that government can simply print money, spend it, 
and issue bonds due to its monopoly hold on currency, subject only to the limits of 
inflation.72  
The choice to use monetary policy instruments rather than tax policy instruments 
or government borrowing to fund relief or bailouts raises important issues of democracy, 
governance, and distribution, and structures relationships of power.73 Likewise, the choice 
of increasing taxes as opposed to running a federal deficit or printing money raises similar 
issues, as well as issues of intergenerational cost spreading.74 In essence, the question will 
be how the United States pays for the cost of social insurance, stimulus, and bailout 
solutions deployed in the COVID-19 crisis, and who the winners and losers will be. 
 
G. Insufficiency of Existing Theoretical Paradigms 
We anticipate that existing theoretical paradigms may prove insufficient as analytical 
tools capable of identifying the right policy solutions and may have to be modified and 
extended to analyze our “new normal.” For example, with respect to social insurance 
delivery, the existing literature examines whether delivery should be done directly (such 
as through food stamps or a UBI) or indirectly (for example, via indirect tax expenditures 
or through tax administration or the consumer bankruptcy system)75 and has also framed 
the issue as one of institutional choice.76 But these frameworks may not be nuanced enough 
to encompass the considerations identified here. For example, the existing literature does 
not provide a framework for thinking about social insurance delivery in a time of critical 
spatio-behavioral constraints and supply-side demands. Specifically, the current challenge 
is to provide social safety net support in a way that enables continued individual spending 
on the “right” things (such as rent and necessities), while discouraging people from 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March/April 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-01-27/whos-afraid-
budget-deficits. 
72 Under that rubric, taxation would then be regarded as primarily redistributive or an inflation control. Visser 
(1991). 
73 Desan (2005, 2015).  
74 Buchanan (2009). 
75 Alstott (1995); Feibelman (2005); Fleischer & Hemel (2017, 2019); Graetz, Mashaw & Mashaw (1999); 
Leff (2019); Levitin (2010); Oei (2011, 2012) 
76 Weisbach & Nussim (2003). 
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engaging in the “wrong” kind of consumption (consumption that might compromise  
“social distancing” and lead to COVID-19 spread). Moreover, the policy decision is 
complicated by the fact that the socially undesirable behavior in question is not per se 
undesirable (e.g., violent crime, drug use, or child abuse) but would in fact be relatively 
blameless or even economically and socially beneficial—growth-enhancing—in ordinary 
times. This may test the effectiveness of our current understanding of the choice between 
direct and indirect delivery mechanisms, or of the operation of institutional divisions and 
boundaries in performing effective social insurance delivery while threading the behavioral 
needle. It may also raise particularly vexing design and policy choice issues in a situation 
in which the systemic economic risks are real. 
IV. COMMENTARY ON COVID-19 INITIATIVES 
A. Initial U.S. Legislative Response to COVID-19: H.R. 6201 
Congress made its initial foray into legislative responses to COVID-1977 with a 
House bill—the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (H.R. 6201)—passed early on 
March 14, 2020.78  H.R. 6201 addresses a range of health, employment, and business 
concerns. Here, we walk through the basic policy choices that Congress made and examine 
their likely success in achieving and balancing the key policy concerns of social insurance, 
systemic economic and financial risk management, and spatio-behavioral management.  
 
77 According to the CDC, the 2020 outbreak of respiratory disease is being caused by a novel coronavirus. 
The virus, now named “SARS-CoV-2” causes the disease named “Coronavirus disease 2019”,or “COVID-
19.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (Updated March 15, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/Coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/summary.html. In some places, H.R. 6201 
defines a covered health emergency as “the declaration of a public health emergency, based on an outbreak 
of SARS-CoV-2 or another coronavirus with pandemic potential.” (see H.R. 6201 Division A – Second 
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020). In the amendments to the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, the legislation defines coronavirus by reference to the language in the Section 
506 of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (“the term 
‘coronavirus’ means SARS–CoV–2 or another coronavirus with pandemic potential”). 
78  H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. § 3102 (2020), available at, 
https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20200309/BILLS-116hr6201-SUS.pdf; House Appropriations 
Committee Summary at, 
https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Families%20First%20Sum
mary%20FINAL.pdf 
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1. Overview 
H.R. 6201 includes seven major response categories: 
(1) FMLA expansion: emergency-based expansion of Family and Medical Leave Act 
benefits;  
(2) Paid sick leave: introduction of a new employer requirement to provide paid sick leave 
in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic;   
(3) Special short-term tax benefits: tax credits for paid sick leave and family medical leave; 
(4) Stabilizing unemployment benefits programs: special funding for states’ accounts in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund and authority for states to relax existing requirements for 
applicants; 
(5) Free testing: a requirement for group health plans and insurers (along with Medicare, 
Medicaid, CHIP, and other government health coverage programs) to provide coverage of 
COVID-19 testing and related services at no cost;79 
(6) Nutrition program waivers: ensuring continued and expanded access to SNAP 
(supplemental nutritional assistance program) and to school lunches (following school 
closures); and 
(7) Special funding and waivers for several food and other social services government 
programs: These programs include the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program, the 
Commodity Assistance Program,  Department of Defense Health Program, Taxpayer 
Services at the Internal Revenue Service, Indian Health Services, DHHS Aging and 
Disability Services Programs, Public Health Social Services Emergency Fund, and 
Veterans Health Administration Medical Services. 
Three of the major provisions (Categories 5-7) provide increased financial support 
for and more flexible access to government benefits programs already in place that are 
designed to provide food, health, and other social services to vulnerable populations. 
 
79 The emphasis on no-cost COVID-19 testing aims to eliminate one friction to identifying those who 
are ill —the costs associated with testing, even with insurance. At the time of proposal, however, the 
actual availability of tests remains a major limitation. 
 
 
27 
 
Although such programs can indirectly impact the private sector (for example, through 
health care or other expenditures), they are primarily government-based. Thus, they 
reinforce the policy goals of social insurance and spatio-behavioral management by 
providing social assistance and support to individuals who have contracted or been exposed 
to COVID-19 (for example, those who are ill and need to stay home from work), or who 
are otherwise negatively affected (for example, workers caring for ill family members or 
facing layoffs), which will hopefully incentivize desirable spatial behaviors that limit 
disease transmission. For example, relaxed requirements for unemployment benefits may 
enable workers to qualify for benefits even if they are not actively seeking work at a time 
when aggressively pursuing new employment may run counter to public health officials’ 
recommendations on social distancing, reducing business operations, and reducing public 
transit use. Similarly, access to funds substituting for school lunches after school closures 
may advance social insurance and spatio-behavioral policy goals by alleviating financial 
pressures while avoiding contagion in school environments. 
The remaining four provisions involve businesses, workers, and commercial 
markets, and thus likely reach a far greater number of actors, networks, and systems across 
society. Thus, in designing these provisions, Congress has to make critical policy tradeoffs 
between social insurance, systemic risk management, and spatio-behavioral 
considerations. We now examine the four major private sector provisions along these 
dimensions. 
2. Congressional Action in the Market 
a. Family and Sick Leave Emergency Provisions Generally 
Two provisions of the House Bill (Categories 1-2) introduce language granting paid 
leave and related coverage for workers who experience work-related interruptions due to 
COVID-19. Together, they address social insurance concerns in ways that appear to further 
spatio-behavioral goals: encouraging socially beneficial behaviors during a pandemic and 
reducing behaviors that could escalate the crisis. That said, however, certain features of the 
provisions may limit these impacts and ultimately advance neither goal.  
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b. Expansion of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
The first provision, the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, 
expands the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1933 (“FMLA”)’s coverage.80 H.R. 6201 
amends sections 101 and 102 of the FMLA to ensure expanded access to its twelve-week 
guaranteed unpaid leave by: (1) relaxing the definition of eligible “employees”81; (2) 
expanding the definition of “parent”82 to allow FMLA benefits to kick in when the worker 
provides care for a broader range of family members; and (3) including qualifying needs 
related to the announced public health emergency as grounds for a leave request. 83 
Qualified employees covered under the COVID-19 public health emergency-basis for 
leave are granted entitlements to the FMLA’s existing unpaid leave benefits for an initial 
14 days (for which the employee may opt to substitute any accrued vacation, personal 
medical, or sick leave). Thereafter, such employees are entitled to paid leave for the rest of 
their twelve-week FMLA leave period at an amount not less than two-thirds of their 
“regular rate” for the number of hours the employee “would otherwise be normally 
scheduled to work.”84  
On first impression, the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act 
aggressively expands wage support for workers who need to take time off of work for their 
own COVID-19 health issues or those of a family member. Accordingly, the provision 
would introduce the kinds of social insurance for individuals that would offer a critical 
safety net in a period of significant economic dislocation. Additionally, by encouraging 
and facilitating affected workers’ decisions to stay home, the new benefits would promote 
critical social distancing and isolation, whether by keeping a potentially infected worker at 
 
80 H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. § 3102 (2020) (Division C). 
81  Here Congress reduces the period of time the employee must have worked for the employer before 
becoming eligible from 12 months to 30 days. See id. at § 3102(b) (amending as Section 110(a)(1)(A)). 
82  Compare id. §3102(b) (amending as Section 110(a)(1)(C)), with definition in existing statute before 
amendments, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7). 
83 H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. § 3102(a)(1) (amending as Section 102(1)(a)(F) (adding as basis for leave “a 
qualifying need related to a public health emergency”)). This expansive public health emergency basis 
encompasses worker non-attendance in compliance with a Coronavirus-related order or recommendation 
from a public official or health care provider (whether grounded in the health issues of the worker or a family 
member). See id. § 3102(b) (amending as Section 110(a)(2)(A)). 
84 Id. (amending as Section 110(b)). 
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home or by keeping a potentially infected family member (such as minor children) at home 
as well. 
However, three additional provisions in the amended FMLA language may 
dramatically reduce the scope of employees’ access to the new leave benefits. First, the 
“employer” threshold for FMLA coverage shifts from its original “50 or more employees” 
to “fewer than 500 employees” under the House bill.85  When understood with other 
amended language, this revision points in two different directions that may expand or 
reduce access to the Bill’s extended support. On the one hand, shifting to “fewer than 500 
employees” expands the scope of covered “employers” to smaller businesses with fewer 
than 50 employees. However, the cap at 500-employee cap leaves employees at larger firms 
ineligible for leave requests under the new COVID-19 public health emergency-basis for 
requesting leave. Those employees are left to rely only on existing firm leave policies, and  
while some well-known large firms have voluntarily extended paid leave to employees 
impacted by the COVID-19, there is no obligation to do so and no evidence of universal 
adoption by big business.  
While proponents of the Bill have yet to explain the “fewer than 500 employee” 
cap, it may be that firms with 500+ employees are exempted from the amended paid leave 
requirements as a means of balancing the social insurance goals with the desire to forestall 
a broader system-wide economic fallout. Allowing larger firms that may have debt 
liabilities to avoid incurring additional labor costs from having to compensate a large 
number of employees seeking COVID-19-related FMLA leave could help prevent them 
tipping over the edge, which could cause cascading economic effects. But President Trump, 
a number of Senators, and labor leaders have already expressed concerns about the 500+-
employee cap. 
Second, expanding leave requirements to firms with fewer than 50 workers, while 
facially allowing more employee access to leave benefits, does not guarantee it. The 
Secretary of Labor is granted authority under the Administrative Procedure Act to issue 
rulemakings and regulations granting “hardship waivers” that would exempt smaller 
businesses with fewer than 50 employees if the new requirements would “jeopardize the 
 
85 Id. (amending as Section 110(a)(1)(B)). 
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viability of the business.”86 The Secretary of Labor can also issue regulations that would 
exclude certain health care providers and others from the definition of eligible 
“employees.”87 Thus, what appears to be a major legislative reform combining valuable 
social insurance for COVID-19-affected employees and that simultaneously advance 
spatio-behavioral management goals may turn out not to cover many employees in the 
United States. Ultimately, the real-world impact of the Emergency Family and Medical 
Leave Expansion Act will turn on what portion of workers are employed by small 
businesses and how readily the Secretary of Labor grants small businesses regulatory 
waivers to comply. 
Third, the paid wages to which employees are entitled under H.R. 6201’s FMLA 
expansion may not match their real-life weekly pay, thereby leaving them with a gap. The 
FMLA coverage provides pay at two-thirds of a formulaic rate under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, Section 7(e). Given that the benchmark rate may be below the employee’s 
actual hourly rate, and given that the paid leave is only for two-thirds of that amount, most 
covered employees will likely receive paid leave that does not equal their actual weekly 
pay.88 For those workers already living paycheck to paycheck, the new paid leave—while 
certainly better than no paid leave—may render them unable to meet all of their regular 
bills and may make them vulnerable to pressure to keep working or come back earlier than 
public health needs would suggest. While the two-thirds’ rate may be designed to prevent 
moral hazard (in which the worker takes unnecessary health risks ex ante due to the 
existence of the coverage), the gravity of the public health situation may counsel against 
such a reduced rate. 
 
c. Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act 
A companion to the above FMLA reforms—the Emergency Paid Sick Leave 
Act89—is an entirely new regime that guarantees employer-provided paid sick leave at 
“regular rates” for qualified employees needing time off for: (1) COVID-19 self-isolation; 
 
86 Id. (amending as Section 110(a)(3)). 
87 Id. 
88 New section 110(b)(2)(B)(i) of the FMLA, added by H.R. 6201, Section 3102. 
89 H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. § 5101 et seq. 
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(2) medical diagnosis or care for symptoms; or (3) compliance with public official or health 
care provider recommendations or orders regarding COVID-19. Qualified workers are also 
entitled to paid sick days at two-thirds their “regular rate” of pay for any of the above 
regarding a family member.90 Available paid sick time under the new provisions is capped 
at 80 hours for full-time employees. Such leave is in addition to any paid leave otherwise 
made available to employees by the firm. Similar to the new language for the FLMA, this 
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act limits covered “employers” to those with fewer than 500 
employees. 
These new provisions sets forth a series of benchmark wage rates that serve as the 
minimum required compensation rate for pay under the new paid sick leave provisions.91 
These minimums are based on Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage rates, “regular 
rate” calculations for overtime, or State or local minimum wage rates and in many cases 
may be below the hourly wage the employee generally receives. In such cases, the paid 
leave would not reach the level of the employee’s usual hourly (and hence, weekly) pay 
and may render the worker unable to meet rent or utilities—similar to the situation that 
employees may face under the paid leave portion of the FMLA. Where the employee is 
receiving sick leave pay while caring for a family member, they are entitled to only 2/3 of 
the amount they would receive for their own personal sick leave.92 The gap between the 
employee’s usual weekly pay and the paid leave they receive under the Emergency Paid 
Sick Leave Act may potentially limit employee willingness to engage in desired social-
distancing behaviors because it provides a more limited social safety net than non-paid 
leave wages. Again, the gap may be designed with the view of avoiding the moral hazard 
of workers, counting on receiving full paid sick leave, taking unnecessary health risks ex 
ante; but again, the gravity of the crisis and the spatio-behavioral considerations that crisis 
management entails calls the provision’s design into question. 
In summary, with the legislative introduction of the two new paid leaves detailed 
above, employees who are sick, at risk of being sick, caring for those who may be sick, or 
 
90 Id. § 5110(9)(B)(ii). 
91  H.R. 6201 section 5102(b)(2). Full time employees, otherwise qualified under the 
provisions are entitled to this pay for 80 hours. 
92 H.R. 6201 section 5110(9)(b)(ii). 
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caring for students experiencing COVID-19 related school closures may be more willing 
to stay home and miss work.93 In doing so, they will be supporting the broader public health 
interest in limiting transmission by ill or potentially ill individuals. But, to the extent that 
the pay granted by the new provisions falls short of their actual weekly pay, or more 
critically, are not required to be provided by their employer at all, then social insurance and 
spatial and behavioral goals are met only partially at best, or not at all, at worst.  
 
d. Tax Credits for Paid Sick and Family Leave 
Standing alone, the paid leave provisions just discussed would place the burden of 
providing employee social insurance exclusively on the firms themselves (or, in the case 
of self-employed individuals, would provide no external financial relief).  
The new tax credits introduced in H.R. 6201 address that third prong of policy goals 
—trying to ensure continued functioning of the financial and economic system and reduce 
the risk of systemwide distress and broader contagion due to business failure—by 
providing relief for employers via a payroll tax credit.94 Under these new tax provisions, a 
refundable tax credit would be allowed as an offset to payroll taxes under I.R.C. § 3111 (or 
as an offset to the income taxes for the self employed). The credit would be available for 
employers providing paid sick or family leave, and for self-employed individuals unable 
to work under comparable circumstances. Thus, businesses that may be experiencing lower 
revenues and higher wage costs would receive government financial support through a 
quarterly tax credit delivery mechanism. 
i. Initial Presidential Proposal 
 
The basic design of this tax relief stands in marked contrast to the administration’s 
proposal of early March 2020: President Trump initially suggested a payroll tax cut, 
reducing the payroll tax rate to 0% for the remainder of 2020, as the primary form of 
 
93 OR even those dependents impacted by COVID-19 related closures, see H.R. 6201 Section 3201, adding 
new section 110(a)(2)(A)(iii). In the case of school closures, to the extent that these paid leave provisions 
work as imagine, they could reduce community resistance to school closures, making it easier for public 
health officials to pursue appropriate public health policies. 
94 H.R. 6201, §§ 7001 et seq. (Division G). 
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business and worker relief.95 This recommendation was envisioned as a mix of market 
stimulus, business relief and assistance to workers. However, the proposal’s mechanism 
was poorly targeted for meeting the core policy considerations underlying effective 
COVID-19 crisis management for several reasons: (1) a payroll tax cut benefits everyone, 
not just the workers and businesses impacted by COVID-19, and thus may be a waste of 
tax dollars that may lead indirectly to dismantling of the social security safety net;96 (2) if 
the primary mission of a payroll reduction is providing social insurance to workers, then 
the reduction in the firm’s side of the payroll tax offers little relief if the benefit is not 
passed on (and there is no guarantee it will be); (3) the benefit of the payroll tax to the 
business (as a buttress against reduced revenues) may be small if payroll taxes are low (for 
example, if most of the business’s costs are in expenses other than wages); (4) as the 
primary worker benefit, the reduction in payroll tax would be poorly timed, too limited, or 
not available to key populations because the reduction in payroll taxes is a benefit that is 
capped at the amount of the worker’s payroll tax, is distributed over-time (as payroll taxes 
otherwise due are no longer withheld from the paycheck), and is only available to the 
currently employed (and not to workers who are laid-off due to a business downturn).  
The President’s proposed payroll tax cut may have intentionally sought to provide 
widespread financial relief to workers regardless of whether they were experiencing 
personal or family illness, in an effort to boost broad consumer spending. This 
interpretation seems consistent with the administration’s messaging about consumer 
spending and economic stimulus.97 But as we have noted in in Parts I and II of this paper, 
 
95 Jim Tankersley, Trump’s Payroll Tax Cut Would Dwarf the 2008 Bank Bailout, NY TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/business/trump-tax-cut-coronavirus.html (“Mr. Trump and his top 
advisers have pitched the cut as a much-needed lift for consumers and businesses at a time when the spreading 
virus is beginning to chill economic activity. ‘The payroll tax holiday is probably the most important, 
powerful piece of this,’ Larry Kudlow, the director of the National Economic Council.”). 
96 Id. 
97  See Tankersley, supra note 95; Donald J. Trump, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1238442385048305664?s=20  Twitter (Mar. 13, 2020) (“If you 
want to get money into the hands of people quickly & efficiently, let them have the full money that they 
earned, APPROVE A PAYROLL TAX CUT until the end of the year, December 31. Then you are doing 
something that is really meaningful. Only that will make a big difference!”); Mike Patton, Trump 
Administration Considers Reducing Payroll Tax to Zero, FORBES (March 10, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2020/03/10/trump-administration-considers-reducing-payroll-tax-
to-zero/#606471cd3188 (“The rationale [for the Trump administration payroll tax cut] is to put more money 
in the hands of consumers so they will spend more and keep our economy strong. This action is especially 
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policy instincts that may be appropriate in the time of normal financial and business crises 
pose special risks when the precipitating event is a pandemic. The spatial and behavioral 
practices needed to best manage the COVID-19 crisis may counsel against fiscal packages 
that encourage traditional consumer spending. In the current crisis, the short-term goal is 
to encourage individuals to engage in increased social distancing and to reduce traditional 
forms of consumer spending that involve public gatherings (travel, sports and 
entertainment, sit-down restaurants, bars, etc). Of course, socially intimate consumption 
may be discouraged by pairing fiscal stimulus with draconian direct restrictions on human 
contact and movement (which are increasingly being put in place). But such direct spatial 
restrictions may suppress the potential positive impacts of the fiscal stimulus.  
On the flip side, if the primary goal of the proposal is to free up cash for struggling 
businesses (as opposed to provide spending cash to individual workers or consumers), then 
the payroll tax cut is a good tool (at least the employer portion) because it helps businesses 
save cash on a quarterly, ongoing basis. Thus, while a payroll tax cut may fulfill limited 
elements of our unique COVID-19 policy goals, it does not fulfill others, may actively 
undermine some, and may be unduly expensive. Thus, as pandemic crisis management 
legislation, the proposed payroll tax cut constitutes a poor policy tool. Some of these 
critiques of the proposed payroll tax cut were publicly discussed, and may have helped 
guide the design of the H.R. 6201 payroll tax credit. 
ii. Payroll Tax Credit in the House Legislation 
 
The payroll tax credits in H.R. 6201 are provided through four provisions that track 
the new paid leave sections that we discussed above.98  
(1) Employer credit for new paid sick leave: Section 7001 of H.R. 6201 provides a 
credit for employers against payroll taxes imposed by I.R.C. § 3111(a), where the 
credit is calculated based on paid leave granted under the new Emergency Paid Sick 
Leave Act.  
 
(2) Self-employed credit for amounts equivalent to new “paid sick leave”: Section 
7002 provides a credit for self-employed individuals based on the paid sick leave 
 
on point since consumer spending accounts for nearly 70% of total GDP and has been the driving force 
behind our economic growth of late.”). 
98 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.a-c. 
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to which they would be entitled under the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act, if they 
were employed. 
 
(3) Employer credit for new required paid family and medical leave under the revised 
FMLA: Section 7003 provides a credit for employers against payroll taxes imposed 
by I.R.C. § 3111(a), where the credit is calculated based on qualified leave wages 
paid pursuant to the expansion of the FMLA in H.R. 6201.  
 
(4) Self-employed credit for amounts equivalent to new required paid leave under the 
revised FMLA: Section 7004 provides a credit for self-employed individuals based 
on the qualified leave wages to which they would be entitled under the expanded 
FMLA in H.R. 6201, if they were employed. 
 
Employer Credits. The two employer credits (Sections 7001 and 7003 of H.R. 
6201) aim to reduce the burden on business of providing social insurance to employees 
through the new paid leave provisions. While the new paid leave provisions themselves 
addressed the direct issues of social insurance and encouraging desired spatial-behavioral 
practices, these tax credits recognize that businesses already facing significant losses due 
to the coronavirus outbreak may be ill equipped to fully bear the costs of social insurance. 
Although the credits have caps, the amount of paid leave actually provided under the 
expanded FMLA and the new emergency paid sick leave rules are likely to be below the 
caps for the group of workers for whom the provisions are most intended—low wage 
employees.99 Thus, many businesses providing the newly required paid sick leave may find 
that the credits are sufficient to cover their sick leave payouts, even if the employees find 
that the sick leave itself is somewhat less than their usual paycheck. The tax credits may 
even help support the social insurance and the spatio-behavioral goals of COVID-19 crisis 
management: businesses may be less resistant to providing paid leave to workers and less 
likely to challenge their workers’ entitlement to the benefits when their direct financial 
costs are fully compensated.  
 
99 See discussion infra.  Compare H.R. 6201 section 7001(b) setting the maximum wages for which a credit 
is permitted at $511 per day for sick leave due to the worker’s own health condition (and $200 per day for 
sick leave to care for a relative) for a maximum of 10 days, with H.R. 6201 section 5110(9)(B) (setting forth 
a series of benchmark wage rates that serve as the minimum required compensation rate, all of which are 
based on some version of minimum wage or Fair Labor Standards Act rates for overtime) and with H.R. 6201 
section 5102(b)(2) (sick pay is for 80 hours for full time employees). 
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Self-Employed Credits. The two credits for the self-employed are more akin to the 
paid leave for employees in their impact. The credits provide a financial benefit to workers 
when they need to take time off for COVID-19 related reasons and are unable to work. 
Seen that way, these credits both provide social insurance for the self-employed and 
encourage such workers to stay home when COVID-19 illness renders it prudent for them 
to do so for public health reasons. Thus, although the relief to the self-employed 
structurally mirrors that provided to employers (credits based on the new statutorily 
mandated paid leave amounts for employees), the impact of the self-employed taxpayer’s 
tax credits more closely tracks the direct benefits provided in H.R. 6201 to employees. 
Refundability. All four of the credits are designed to be refundable. Thus, in contrast 
to the total maximum value of the President’s proposed reduction of the payroll tax to 0% 
until the end of 2020, these new tax credits are not limited by the amount of tax owed by 
the employer (or the self-employed individual). At a more detailed level, however, the 
precise design of both the employer and self-employed tax credits will dictate exactly how 
much economic support it offers business and how much social insurance it actually 
provides the self employed. As noted above, both the expanded FMLA benefits and the 
new sick pay provisions have limits on the size of the employers to whom they apply and 
utilize a formulaic approach to determining the amount of paid leave.  
Moreover, employers paying these workers are more likely to find that their new 
tax credit fully offsets the paid leave they are required to offer. For example, they are 
entitled to a credit for 100% of the qualified FMLA leave wages paid for the quarter, with 
a cap of $200 per day and $10,000 per quarter for the worker. At that level, even with the 
cap, the employer’s credit should generally cover the required FMLA paid leave for low-
wage workers who are the primary intended beneficiaries of the legislation.100   
Summary. Ultimately, the new legislation, with its combined package that includes 
new required paid sick or family leave for workers and tax credits for employers providing 
those wages, responds to the three key goals of (1) social insurance for workers,  (2) 
preventing widespread market distress and waves of business collapse, and (3) 
encouragement of good spatial and behavioral practices in a time of pandemic. Yet, the 
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balance among the three goals may not be equal. At least with respect to the paid leave 
portions of the House Bill, the benefit to employees may not be as robust as the benefit to 
the employers—suggesting a prioritization of the market concerns or moral hazards 
concerns over both social insurance and spatial and behavioral goals. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Working Paper identifies and discusses the ramifications of three interrelated 
but potentially conflicting policy priorities in regulating during the COVID-19 crisis: (1) 
providing social insurance to individuals and families in need; (2) managing systemic 
economic and financial risk; and (3) encouraging critical spatial behaviors to help contain 
COVID-19 transmission. We will continually update this Paper as a working document to 
incorporate our analysis of legislation and policy proposals as the crisis unfolds. 
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